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Abstract: States in the Latin American and Caribbean regions have long called for the creation
of an independent, international court to prosecute members of transnational organized crime
gangs. These organizations not only profit from the illicit traffic in drugs, people and cultural
property, but are able to corrupt and undermine the domestic legal systems and judiciaries of the
affected states. This paper examines the current proposal for the creation of the "Latin American
and Caribbean Criminal Court Against Transnational Organized Crime" (COPLA). It reviews
the rationale for creating such a court, examines the main pillars of the current proposal, and
suggests the potential for it to play a normative and regulatory role in the transnational criminal
law ecosystem.

Introduction
Founded by treaty1 in the late 20th century and operational by early in the 21st,2 the
International Criminal Court (ICC) is undoubtedly one of the most prominent and important
international legal institutions in the world. During the drafting process and negotiations that led
to the founding of the ICC, consensus emerged that its subject matter jurisdiction should be over
the “core crimes” of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression3—all more
or less fair candidates for customary international law status and agreed to be the most serious
crimes facing the world. One of the great modern ironies of international criminal justice,
however, is that the original proposal that gave rise to the ICC was for a court of a very different
nature.
In 1989 a coalition of Caribbean states led by Trinidad and Tobago proposed to the
General Assembly that it revive the idea of an international criminal court,4 which was first
contemplated in the immediate post-WWII period but which became a casualty of the Cold
War.5 The idea was motivated by these states’ general inability to cope with transnational
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criminal gangs which were profiting mightily from the narcotics trade, and who facilitated their
activities by violence and corruption that undermined policing, prosecution and the courts. There
was also a need for a pressure valve to relieve some of the burden of being on the front lines of
the U.S.-sponsored “war on drugs”; as Professor Boister notes:
The sponsoring states appear to have believed that a territorially remote ICC able to
deal with serious treaty crimes and to send convicts to prison in states remote from
the locus delicti would help make for more effective domestic suppression of crime
as well as halt the erosion of their sovereignty and national pride by powerful states
that either obliged them to extradite offenders and provide legal assistance or
effective took control of domestic suppression of these crimes.6
The General Assembly was open to the idea and directed the International Law
Commission (ILC) to examine the possibility of examining the prospects for such a court. 7
However, enthusiasm for establishing the ICC as a prosecutorial venue for the core crimes
quickly gained momentum, and though proposals to include narcotics trafficking and other
transnational crimes (particularly terrorism) featured in the Rome debates, in the end opposition
by the U.S. and other powerful states dissipated the idea.8 The Final Act of the Rome Diplomatic
Conference did recommend that a Review Conference consider the inclusion of terrorist crimes
and transnational narcotics trafficking into the subject matter of the ICC,9 but the idea garnered
no attention in the 2010 Kampala Review Conference and has not been on the radar in any of the
Assembly of States Parties meetings since. There is an immense literature on the possibility and
propriety of inserting various treaty crimes into the ICC’s activities,10 but the prospect has not
yet attracted any political will. Despite their proposal having sparked the creation of the ICC, the
situation of the coalition of states led by Trinidad & Tobago was swept aside and left
unaddressed.
Recently, however, a new proposal which revives the prospect of establishing a standing
international criminal court to prosecute serious treaty crime violations has been gaining traction
with NGOs and governments in the Americas. A campaign to establish COPLA (Corte Penal
Latinoamericana y del Caribe contra el Crimen Transnacional Organizado)11 is conceived as a
court created by treaty between all Caribbean and Latin American signatories of the 2000 United
6

Neil Boister, “Treaty Crimes, International Criminal Court?” (2009) 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 341 [Boister, Treaty
Crimes] at 343.
7
UN Doc A/RES/44/39 (4 December 1989)
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For details see Darryl Robinson, “The Missing Crimes,” in Antonio Cassese et al, eds, The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP 2002) at 497; Neil Boister, “The Exclusion of Treaty
Crimes from the Jurisdiction of the Proposed International Criminal Court: Law, Pragmatism, Politics” (1998) 3 J.
Armed Conflict L. 27.
9
Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (17 July 1998),
Resolution E.
10
A fairly extensive list of articles on the topic of provided in Neil Boister, “International Tribunals for
Transnational Crimes: Towards a Transnational Criminal Court?” (2012) 23 Crim L Forum 295 [Boister, Int’l
Tribunals], 296 at fn 3.
11
The English translation is “Latin American and Caribbean Criminal Court Against Transnational Organized Crime”
(http://www.coalicioncopla.org/en/what-is-copla/)
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Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime12 and its protocols.13 The court is
intended to be based, in structure, on the ICC. Its subject matter jurisdiction, however, would
include the crimes in the UNTOC and its Protocols, as well as the crimes of drug trafficking,
money laundering, transnational bribery and the illicit trade in cultural artifacts committed on the
territories of States Parties.
The campaign to establish COPLA was launched by Democracia Global, an Argentinian
NGO, in 2013, and is currently being promoted by Coalicion COPLA,14 a group of NGOs
predominantly based in Latin America but which also includes the Canadian branch of the World
Federalist Movement,15 the US-based Coalition for the International Criminal Court16 and
European group No Peace Without Justice.17 It has recently begun to attract interest from Latin
American governments18 and on 20 September 2017 the Vice President of Argentina, Gabriela
Michetti, made a presentation to the UN General Assembly in which she noted that state’s
support for the COPLA proposal, stating that it would help to address the “essential” need to
combat the narcotics trade.19 On 13 December 2017, a side event promoting COPLA was held as
part of the ICC ASP meetings in New York, which featured the Argentinian ambassador to the
UN, among others, as a speaker.20
It is early days for the effort to establish COPLA, and as of the time of writing the “hard”
documentation relating to it consists primarily of promotional materials, background information
and a preliminary draft of a potential statute that was formulated by the “COPLA Legal Experts
Group,” a group of Latin American legal scholars (a copy of which, in English translation, is
attached as Appendix A to this paper). However, the momentum towards COPLA follows
reasonably quickly on the conclusion of the Malabo Protocol,21 which creates jurisdiction over
transnational crimes within the framework of the African Court of Justice and Human and
Peoples’ Rights. Accordingly, it is worth evaluating the prospects of COPLA as a new institution
within the transnational criminal law ecosystem.

12

2225 UNTS 209 (2000) [UNTOC]
That is, the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components
and Ammunition, UN Doc A/RES/55/255, Annex (8 June 2001); the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants By
Land, Sea and Air, UN Doc A/RES/55/255, Annex 3 (15 November 2000); and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
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Online: www.npwj.org
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See “Parliamentarians for COPLA” at http://www.coalicioncopla.org/en/parlamentarians-for-copla/
19
See Government of Argentina, Mision Permanente de la Republica Ante Las Naciones Unidas, “Discurso de la
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http://www.coalicioncopla.org/articulos/copla-una-respuesta-regional-al-crimen-organizado-transnacional/
21
African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights (adopted at the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in
Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 27 June 2014) (‘Malabo Protocol’).
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The goal of this paper, then, is to serve as an introduction to COPLA as an international
law institution, and primarily at the conceptual level. It will first examine the very idea of the
utility of a transnational criminal court, as well as the motivation for its founding in the Latin
America/Caribbean region. Then, relying on the current draft statute, some of the major features
of the COPLA proposal will be reviewed, including the novel suggestion of the institute
functioning as a regional facilitator of police investigation, and a view taken of how such a court
might function as a regulator of transnational criminal law.
Transnational Criminal Court: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?22
Whither a Transnational Criminal Court?
Given that the international criminal justice scene has been dominated by international
and “internationalized” courts23 that are nearly exclusively dedicated to adjudication of the core
crimes, it is important to locate and distinguish the idea of what a “transnational criminal court”
is and how it can and should be distinguished. The normative and jurisprudential space being
referred to is best captured in the concept of “transnational criminal law” (TCL), which of late is
being taken seriously as a sub-field of public international law.24 At its broadest this field covers
any crime which has cross-border aspects, and thus raises international law issues,25 but most
usually refers to a network of anti-crime treaties known as “suppression conventions.” These
treaties are struck primarily in order to deal with criminal conduct that is of interest to and
impacts upon a number of states, and specifically to resolve issues of jurisdiction relating to the
investigation and prosecution of these crimes—specifically that criminals, evidence and
increasingly the physical elements of crimes themselves cross borders and end up beyond the
lawful reach of domestic law enforcement.
The treaties co-ordinate inter-state cooperation in suppression of these crimes, typically
requiring that each party state 1) criminalize the conduct in question, 2) agree to broader
extensions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct, 3) agree to either prosecute or
extradite alleged offenders who are apprehended, and 4) provide various forms of assistance to
treaty partner states, including extradition, mutual legal assistance and policing cooperation.26
There is a fairly large number of these conventions and many are widely subscribed to, such as

22

It is too difficult to resist using the hackneyed phrase “an idea whose time has come” in this paper, as it is one
that pervades the literature on international criminal justice generally, perhaps because it speaks effectively to the
long germination of the notions which are now seeing practical development. See most recently Firew Kebede
Tiba, “Regional International Criminal Courts: An Idea Whose Time Has Come” (2016) 17 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol.
521.
23
This refers to the mostly ad hoc criminal tribunals that have been created by treaty to deal with particular
(usually post-conflict) situations. Examples would include the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Cambodia
Extraordinary Chambers, etc. See Currie & Rikhof, supra note 5, chapter 4.
24
See generally Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2d ed (Oxford: OUP, 2018); Neil Boister
& Robert J. Currie, eds, Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law (Routledge, 2014); Currie & Rikhof,
supra note 5, chapter 7.
25
Currie & Rikhof, ibid, at 20-22.
26
Ibid at 327-334.
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the UNTOC, the Vienna Narcotics Convention,27 the UN Terrorist Bombing Convention,28 and
so on. These regimes, then, target crimes based in the international flow of goods or capital (e.g.
money laundering, drug trafficking), or those which take place in territory not easily policed or
controlled by a single state (crimes committed on commercial aircraft for instance).29
Central to understanding the usual reach of TCL is that the overall goal is not the
prosecution of international crimes stricto sensu, like genocide, to which individual liability
attaches under international law itself and which are amenable to being prosecuted before
international courts. Rather, the goal is co-operation in suppressing conduct which is agreed to
amount to criminal behaviour under a plurality of domestic criminal law systems, but where the
conduct is legislatively criminalized only under domestic laws, and prosecutions will proceed
before domestic courts. This is seen not only as a necessary part of the functionality of the
regime but as a selling point—in that criminal law is highly domesticized and states often prefer
to apply their own substantive criminal law and procedure and maintain their prosecutorial goals
and strategies as much as possible.30 Accordingly, prosecution of transnational crimes before an
international court would represent something of a departure from the overall system.
That is not, however, to say that the idea has not been considered—it has31—or that it is
entirely without precedent. As usual with matters in the TCL field, Professor Neil Boister has
done some of the pioneer thinking, and in his leading article on the subject32 he points out that
there is no lack of sound policy reasons or precedents for a TCL court. Chief among the former
is the simple fact that the TCL system itself can break down, particularly due to fractious interstate relations and sovereignty concerns. As Boister has it:
States…may be unwilling to cooperate because they are broadly sympathetic for
some reason with the alleged criminals, or because they are politically antagonistic
towards the requesting state, or because they are implicated in the offences
themselves...[S]tates may not be inclined to help with what they consider to be
some other state’s problem. They may have strong moral objections to extradition.
They may be apprehensive about facilitating the imposition of foreign law and
foreign punishment (often-times more severe) on their fellow countrymen, which

27

United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1582 UNTS
95 (20 December 1988).
28
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, UN Doc A/RES/52/164 (17 December 1997).
29
Neil Boister, “Further reflections on the concept of transnational criminal law” (2015) 6:1 Transnational Legal
Theory 9 at 30.
30
The U.S. government opposed the inclusion of treaty crimes in the jurisdiction of the ICC for essentially this
reason; see J.D. van der Vyver, “Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals” (2010) 24 Emory Int’l Law Rev
527 at 535-36.
31
See, e.g., F. Patel, “Crime Without Frontiers: A Proposal for an International Narcotics Court” (1990) 22 New York
Univ J Intl Law & Politics 709; C. Thedwall, “Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an International Court of
Piracy” (2010) 41 Georgia J of Int’l L 501; E. Creegan, “A Permanent Hybrid Court for Terrorism” (2011) 26
American Univ Int’l Law Rev 237.
32
Boister, Int’l Tribunals, supra note 10.
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they might regard with suspicion. They may find themselves between rich and
violent criminals and a very profitable criminal market.33
Moreover, these problems are particularly profound for smaller states “with weak internal
sovereignty,”34 since they may both need to resist political pressure more powerful states, on the
one hand, and be compromised in terms of their ability to conduct complex investigations and
run numerous, large-scale trials, on the other. It was no accident that the initial Trinidad &
Tobago proposal for reviving the idea of an ICC, noted above, was made by a group of
predominantly small island states caught in the competing pressures generated by the US
campaign against narcotics trafficking.
In terms of precedent, there is certainly a record of past interest and activity around the
idea of transnationalized adjudication of crimes of international concern. Boister points to the
League of Nations’ original effort to establish an “international criminal court” in the form of the
1937 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, which was aimed at the
crime of terrorism as it was (and to the extent it was) then understood.35 This treaty, part of an
effort to head off the political conflicts that eventually erupted in WWII, was accompanied by a
suppression convention seeking to define the crime of terrorism.36 Neither ever came into force,
but represented an early way of allowing states to lift domestic pressures around certain crimes
by essentially exporting the prosecution to a standing international body.37 Interestingly, as
Boister notes, later commentary on the effort lamented that a good idea had failed to come to
fruition and proposed that a similar court based on a regional model might have great potential.38
There are other precedents: regional slavery courts set up by Great Britain in the 18th and
19 centuries;39 the Lockerbie trial, which involved Scottish criminal proceedings being held in
the Netherlands against Libyan nationals, by reason of an international dispute over the
obligations contained in the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation;40 various efforts at the UN level to create a regional piracy court to deal
with Somali piracy, as well as transfers of piracy cases to Kenya and Mauritius;41 and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, set up to prosecute transnational terrorism crimes.42 Most recent and
th
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Ibid at 301.
Ibid at 300.
35
Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, 16 November 1937, 7 Hudson 878.
36
The 1937 Convention of the Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism, League of Nations O.J. 19 (1938), 7
Hudson 862.
37
Boister, Int’l Tribunals, supra note 10 at 308-312.
38
Ibid, citing J.W.F. Sundberg, “Piracy and Terrorism” in M. Cherif Bassiouni & V.P. Nanda, eds, A Treatise on
International Criminal Law (Springfield, Ill: Thomas, 1973), 455 at 484.
39
See Boister, ibid, at 305-306.
40
24 UST 565 (23 September 1971). See David Andrews, “A Thorn on the Tulip - A Scottish Trial in the Netherlands:
The Story behind the Lockerbie Trial” (2005) 36 Case W Res J Intl L 307 (2005); John Grant, “Beyond the Montreal
Convention” (2005) 36 Case W Res J Intl L 453.
41
Dapo Akande, “UN Secretary General sets out options for dealing with Piracy off Somalia,” EJIL Talk! (3
September 2010), online: https://www.ejiltalk.org/un-secretary-general-sets-out-options-for-dealing-with-piracyoff-somalia/
42
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Attachment to SC Resolution 1757, 30 May 2007, UN Doc
S/RES/1757.
34
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interesting is the conclusion of the Malabo Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human and Peoples’ Rights,43 which added a group of what are generally considered
transnational crimes to the subject matter jurisdiction of that court: piracy, terrorism,
mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, trafficking
in hazardous wastes and illicit exploitation of natural resources.44
It is too early in the history of this latter development to assess whether it will function,
but without a doubt it indicates that a regional court mechanism for TCL crimes is an idea that is
gaining momentum. Moreover, the energy behind the idea of adding treaty crimes to the
jurisdiction of the ICC—or any future institution like it—seems to be spent, despite the
mountains of ink spilled in support of the idea. This is quite sensible, given how expensive and
top-heavy the ICC has shown itself to be, not to mention its inability to prosecute cases with
anything like alacrity. A regional approach, focused on crimes of specific interest to the party
states, may be easier to co-ordinate,45 and moreover is more likely to address pressing problems
being faced on a geographical basis, an issue to which we now turn.

The Needs of the Region
As noted above, the ICC itself came about because a coalition of Latin American states
were convinced—as long ago as 1989—of the need for an independent, external and
internationally-founded court in their region. Unsurprisingly, this need has not abated in the
years since. Latin America arguably has become, in recent years, the most violent region in the
world.46 The UNHCR notes that gang conflicts in the “so-called” Northern Triangle of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have escalated the number of violent deaths in the region
beyond what they were in the 1980s, when civil wars wracked these countries. Gangs like the
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13 in particular) and their rivals, Barrio 18, have used tactics of targeted
killings and political corruption to gain de facto control of large sections of the region and have
provoked a refugee crisis.47
At the same time, a less violent, but equally insidious, brand of organized crime imported
from Europe and China continues to subvert the governments of a number of Caribbean
nations.48 The initial movers for the ICC, Trinidad and Tobago, have seen transnational crime-

43

Supra note 21. See Gerhard Worle & Moritz Vorumbaum, eds, The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Malabo Protocol (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017); Charles Cherner Jalloh, “The Nature of Crimes in the African Criminal
Court” (2017) 15 JICJ 799.
44
Ibid, art. 28A.
45
See Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1996, UN Doc E/INCB/1996/1 at para. 14.
46
COPLA, “Latin American Court Against Organized Transnational Crime”, online:
http://www.coalicioncopla.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ING-COPLA-difusi%C3%B3n-30-octubre-2.pdf
47
Tim MacGabahan “Gangs Menace Central Americans Seeking Refuge in Guatemala” UNHCR (1 July 2016) online:
http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2016/7/577395af4/gangs-menace-central-americans-seeking-refugeguatemala.html
48
Miguel Goede, "Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and the Relationship to Good Governance in the
Caribbean" (2013) 12:3 International Journal of Development Issues 253-270
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related violence skyrocket since the early ‘90s and a recent government inquiry concluded that
“international organised crime is firmly entrenched” in that state.49
The severity of the violence committed by Transnational Criminal Organizations in the
region, paired with government complicity and inactivity in the area, has led critics to argue that
many perpetrators could be prosecuted at the ICC for crimes against humanity, even under the
current fairly restrictive definition of the offence.50 Regardless of how these acts should be
classified from a legal standpoint, given the severity of the situation it is easy to see the impetus
behind the suggestion that some form of supranational solution to prosecuting these crimes is
warranted—and indeed, the idea has continued to come up in the years since the initial Trinidad
& Tobago proposal.51
This may, in fact, be one of the strengths of a regionalized model of transnational
criminal prosecution. At the ICC negotiations it became difficult to convince states not faced
with the danger of transnational crime overwhelming their polities to accede to surrendering their
sovereignty in the way required by the ICC prosecution model.52 Given the realities faced by the
Latin America-Caribbean region, however, COPLA is premised on the idea that the political will
might be easier to muster. Even the proposed States Parties whose governments have not yet
been destabilized by the effects of TOC and narcotics trafficking cite these crimes as the most
serious challenges faced by their law enforcement agencies.53 Equally, the majority of proposed
States Parties are small states with limited international influence. Many have experienced the
effects of invasive exercise of American hegemonic powers, incentivizing the creation of this
type of alternative to the influence of larger states. These motivations had already brought many
of the proposed States Parties to become involved in the original coalition of states pushing for
the of treaty crimes at the ICC,54 and explains why members of Democracia Global describe the
reactions of support of officials from the proposed States Parties to COPLA as enthusiastic and
universal.55

Examining COPLA
49

Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to Enquire Into the Events Surrounding the Attempted Coup
d’Etat of 27th July 1990 (13 March 2014), para 1.497, online:
http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/rptcoe1990.pdf
50
Salvador Cuenca, “Narcotráfico: ¿Un crimen de lesa humanidad en el estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal
Internacional?” (2013) 1 Anuario Ibero-Americano de Derecho Internacional Penal, ANIDIP 105, online
https://revistas.urosario.edu.co/index.php/anidip/article/view/286; Heather L Kiefer “Just Say No: The Case
Against Expanding the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction to Include Drug Trafficking” (2009) 31 Loy. L.A.
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 157 at 167.
51
Boister, Treaty Crimes, supra note 6 at 359, fn 76.
52
Ibid at 351.
53
Pedro Brieger, “La Propuesta inédita de la Corte Penal para UNASUR se consilidó en cinco años” (9 november
2016) NODAL (blog) online:
http://www.nodal.am/2016/11/la-propuesta-inedita-de-la-corte-penal-para-unasur-se-consolido-en-cinco-anos/
54
Kiefer, supra note 50 at 163.
55
Maria Florencia Gor, “How to Build a World Community: A World Federalist Movement- Canada Podcast: COPLA
1” (Lecture delivered at the Faculty of Law McGill University September 2016) Online: <
https://soundcloud.com/monique-cuillerier>
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As noted above, COPLA is currently very much in the planning stages, and to the extent
it is a formalized proposal it would be premature to try to assess it in any detail. However, using
the English translation of the current draft Statute,56 this section will review the major pillars of
the current proposal and offer some specific and more general remarks.
“Leadership” Crimes and Substantive Jurisdiction
It is clear right away, in article 1 of the Draft Statute, that COPLA is not intended to be a
forum for the prosecution of garden-variety or street-level crime—rather, “Its purpose shall be to
investigate and prosecute the leaders and heads of criminal organizations responsible” for the
crime within its jurisdiction, and in particular vis-à-vis, “organized criminal groups.”57 This is a
concept immediately familiar within the ICL field, often referred to as “leadership crimes” or the
prosecution of “those most responsible.”58 The latter phrase reflects a policy imperative that
developed through prosecutorial strategizing at the ICC, the idea being that the resources of a
large and expensive standing court should be utilized to prosecute those whose liability attaches
most broadly to large-scale crimes, rather than lower-level perpetrators.59
In the context of COPLA this takes on a different meaning, where the intention is to
attempt to facilitate the breaking up of the leadership of the organized criminal gangs which
bedevil the region—specifically, “those who direct, administer, organize or promote a
transnational organized criminal group[.]”60 This reflects the different needs sought to be served.
Whereas one of the major goals of the ICC and other core crimes tribunals is to ensure
accountability for mass crimes committed in the past, the prosecutorial direction of COPLA is at
least equally intended to impair or even help to destroy the operation of existing organized crime
groups, a point underscored by the intention of ordering confiscation of proceeds of crime.61 This
is, unsurprisingly, commensurate with the goals of the UNTOC and its Protocols as well.
Article 5 sets out the substantive jurisdiction covered by COPLA: illicit trafficking of
narcotics or psychotropic substances; manufacturing and/or illicit trafficking of firearms, their
components, parts and ammunition; trafficking of persons; smuggling of migrants; trafficking of
cultural property; money laundering; and transnational bribery. Each of these offences (with the
exception, at the moment, of transnational bribery) is defined in Article 6, most with definitions
that either are redolent of the relevant suppression conventions or invoke them via reference. For
example, the definition of “trafficking of narcotics” uses some language from Article 3 of the
Vienna Narcotics Convention,62 while the definitions of “firearm”, “trafficking of persons” and
“smuggling of migrants” each refers to the relevant UNTOC Protocol.63 The definition of “Illicit
56

“Draft Statute of the Criminal Court for Latin America and the Caribbean against transnational organized crime,”
attached as Appendix A [COPLA Draft Statute].
57
COPLA Draft Statute, Article 1(2).
58
See Cassandra Steer, Translating Guilt: Identifying Leadership Liability for Mass Atrocity Crimes (T.M.C. Asser
Press, 2017), esp. c. 1, “The Problem of Liability in International Criminal Law”
59
See International Criminal Court, “Office of the Prosecutor,” online: https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp
60
COPLA Draft Statute, Article 5(1).
61
COPLA Draft Statute, Article 30(3).
62
COPLA Draft Statute, Article 6(3)(a).
63
COPLA Draft Statute, Articles 6(b)-(d).
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trafficking of cultural property” is essentially referred away to two relevant instruments,64 while
money laundering is fairly generically defined as the conversion, transfer, selling etc. of “assets
of illicit origin from any of the crimes specified here in or the legislation of the States parties.”65
Article 6 also contains definitions of “organized criminal group,” which draws on the
language of the UNTOC, and criteria for a crime being “transnational” which uses three of the
four criteria from Article 3 of UNTOC. The criterion left out is that in article 3(2)(c) of UNTOC,
which includes as “transnational” a crime committed in one state but involves an organized
criminal group that “engages in criminal activities in more than one state.” The overall
suggestion, then, is that COPLA will only deal with crimes that occur in or affect more than one
state.66
Two points offer themselves for further development of these articles. First, read literally,
article 5 would suggest that the only substantive crime over which COPLA will have jurisdiction
is the direction, administering, organizing or promotion of “a transnational organized criminal
group intended to commit” one of the defined crimes. Yet this is substantially narrower in scope
than even the specific offence of “participation in an organized criminal group” required under
Article 5 of UNTOC, and would miss the opportunity to also try any of the gang leaders for the
predicate crimes themselves. This will likely be fleshed out in subsequent drafts of the statute.
Second, all of the listed crimes will require further development in terms of the elements
required to be proven by the prosecution. The relevant suppression conventions are a starting
point, but the definitions in those treaties are intended simply as a vehicle for agreement between
the states parties on the overall attributes of the offences in question;67 definition at the more
granular level required for actual prosecution is accomplished via the domestic criminal laws of
the parties. Each of the potential states parties to COPLA will have ratified the relevant
conventions (or such ratifications will likely be a requirement for signing), but each will also
have its own, local version of the offence. The solution may be to adopt a model similar to that in
the Rome Statute, which was to set out for each crime an agreed-upon definition of the crime
under international law, and leave the elements to be formulated in subsequent negotiations.
Even this, however, will require further definitional development than is found in the current
draft.
This latter point is worth attention. Criminal law at any level must operate on the
principle of nullem crimen sine lege, i.e. a crime must be sufficiently defined in order to be the
basis of legitimate criminal sanction. One of the main criticisms of including treaty crimes in the
Rome Statute has been the fact that unlike the core crimes, which (with the exception of
aggression) had well-developed definitions in customary international law, there is no such
consensus regarding the treaty crimes. Suppression conventions require states to criminalize
certain acts, but allow States Parties to define the limits of this criminalization; meaning that,
64
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even for states which have signed the same suppression treaty, the definitions of the treaty crimes
in national legislation may be diverse. In turn, while a crime may exist in many or most of the
states over which the court has jurisdiction, there is not necessarily a consensus on the elements
of the crime, their seriousness, or their breadth. While, as noted, this will need to be massaged in
formulating the elements of the crimes, an apparent strength of the COPLA proposal is that the
Court is meant to create a notion of regional criminal responsibility over a set of crimes, and to
assert jurisdiction over these crimes based on a restricted and principled delegation of authority
to do so by the states party to the court.

Referrals and Complementarity
The intention of the draft statute is clearly to establish a standing, permanent court to
adjudicate crimes arising in, and referred from, the party states. In terms of cases coming before
the court, Article 9 says quite simply that “The States Parties hereto accept the jurisdiction of the
Court for the crimes specified herein,” which suggests a fairly broad independence on the
Court’s part in terms of cases over which it exercises jurisdiction. Article 20, setting out the
powers of the Prosecutor, states that the Prosecutor will receive referrals regarding crimes which
could become cases before the court, but with no indication as to an actual referral process or
whether the Prosecutor is to have any proprio motu power to select cases. Article 20(1) does
seem clear, however, that the Prosecutor is meant to “act independently” and has the power to
decide whether to “move forward with an investigation and prosecution.” It states explicitly that
the Prosecutor “will neither request nor comply with instructions from outside the Court.” There
is as yet no system of close supervision of the Prosecutor’s activities by the Court itself, a feature
of the Rome Statute.68
COPLA does not appear to be intended as a court which has primacy of jurisdiction, as
did the ICTY and ICTR due to their status as arms of the UN Security Council. Rather, Article
1(2) provides that COPLA will be “complementary to the national systems of criminal justice”
which will be “authorized to exercise its jurisdiction over … cases that the national systems of
justice are unwilling or unable to try.” All of this language recalls the complementarity scheme
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, and indeed Article 10 (entitled “Questions of
Admissibility”) is quite similar in scope. It suggests that “the Court” will determine the
admissibility of individual cases, considering whether a case has not been investigated or tried by
a state with jurisdiction but which is “unwilling or unable to do so.”69 Also relevant to the
Court’s determination of admissibility are whether the accused is the subject of an international
arrest order (presumably an INTERPOL Red Notice) which has gone six months without an
arrest,70 and whether a state party with jurisdiction over “the case” has issued an acquittal that
the Court holds to be res judicata irrata—i.e. the Court determines that the acquittal in a
particular case was invalid.71
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All of this remains to be substantiated in future drafting, but the policy suggestion is one
of complementarity as a starting point but with a fairly robust ability of COPLA to assume
jurisdiction in appropriate cases, as well as competence to determine when it is legally
appropriate to do so. This makes sense in the context of a region where the problems of
organized crime gangs compromising the functioning of domestic criminal law systems is wellknown, which is in fact a motivator for the creation of the court itself. Indeed, this is analogous
to the rationale behind the ICC’s scheme, which explicitly anticipated that a mechanism would
be needed to deal with states which were somehow shielding perpetrators.72 Nonetheless, it
seems logical that this may very well put the court on a collision course with some state
governments, particularly those which are subject to the influence of criminal organizations in
some way, whether via collusion or intimidation. As the ICC’s forays into complementarity
tangles with states has shown,73 this might be tricky ground to navigate, but is essential if the
court to fulfil the mandate currently proposed for it.

Cooperation and Investigation
The machinery for Court-state cooperation is in fairly skeletal form in Part XIII of the
current draft. Article 35 provides that state parties “will cooperate fully with the Court in relation
to the investigation and prosecution of crimes in the jurisdiction of the Court, in accordance with
the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.” This appears to
incorporate by reference the modalities of cooperation contained within the Inter-American
Convention,74 a measure no doubt made necessary by the fact that a number of states anticipated
as possible members of the Court (e.g. Belize, St. Kitts & Nevis) are not parties to the
Convention. This will doubtless receive some amplification since the Convention itself is
designed for government-to-government cooperation and not all of its machinery will necessarily
translate to the state-Court axis. Article 36 contains definitions of “surrender” and “extradition”
which appear to anticipate future articles concerning the transfer of accused or convicted persons
from states to the Court, or between states, though nothing further on the subject appears.
The language in Part XIII appears to anticipate that as well as prosecuting cases, the
Court will have some kind of active role in investigating them, and as noted above Article 35
binds states to cooperate in whatever form these investigations take. There is no indication as yet
that the Court will be given independent jurisdiction to investigate cases on the territories of state
parties, an exceptional power which is provided under the Rome Statute.75 The Coalicion
COPLA’s promotional material indicates that a possible role of the Court could be to “help with
judicial and police cooperation among member countries,”76 which does not suggest independent
investigation. Article 37 provides that states will create “special group[s]” within their domestic
security forces to enforce decisions and orders of the Court, and Article 30(3)(b) anticipates the
Court submitting requests for confiscation of proceeds of crime to state courts. All of this
72
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suggests a protective attitude towards state sovereignty over criminal law matters, even in cases
where the Court is active.
That said, Article 37 bis presents the possibility of an intriguing further development in
Court-state cooperation, as it anticipates the creation (by way of an Additional Protocol) of a
Regional Intelligence Agency which will coordinate the sharing of information and intelligence
between and among states parties. More is said on this below.
COPLA: A Transnational Regulator in a ‘Sieberian’ Global Order?
In a far-reaching 2010 paper,77 Ulrich Sieber distinguishes a number of models for
approaching the creation and enforcement of transnational law (i.e. the law which attempts to
regulate transnational actors and activities), and decision-making. He sets out the advantages and
disadvantages of each model and evaluates their comparative effectiveness and democratic
legitimacy. He further outlines how to optimize each approach in order to mitigate these
weaknesses. Because of both its breadth and its focus on highlighting solutions which prioritize
the needs of affected parties, this paper provides a useful framework for reviewing the quality of
the COPLA proposal as a supranational regulator in a highly globalized order. In particular,
Sieber’s analysis of the national cooperation and supranational models are useful when
discussing COPLA from this perspective.
National Cooperation Model
It is perhaps tempting to overlook the importance of the national cooperation aspect of
transnational law when reflecting on COPLA. The project is billed, after all, as a regional
criminal court designed to take the stress off overwhelmed national legal systems. However,
because COPLA incorporates the requirement of complementarity, the majority of cases will
continue to be heard at the national level where the de facto regime of interstate cooperation in
enforcing suppression treaties continues. That said, it in the transnational domain where COPLA
proposes some of its most nebulous and wide raging changes to the existing system.
Sieber defines his view of effective cooperation solutions as those which streamline the
ability of states to have their decisions recognized by other courts.78 The COPLA proposal, on
the other hand, does nothing in the way of explicitly adding to the obligations of states to
recognize each other’s decisions. For the most part, the conventions on which the court bases its
jurisdiction already provide for broad and obligatory mutual legal assistance, as well as
requirements to honour requests for the seizure or confiscation of assets. Instead, COPLA makes
a daring proposal aimed at facilitating these underlying obligations to cooperate and recognize
the judgments of other states. As noted above, it proposes the creation of a centralized Regional
Intelligence Agency, which has the potential to significantly streamline the process of mutual
assistance.
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The intended scope of this proposed agency is unclear, as the draft treaty itself leaves the
exact parameters of the agency’s powers to the imagination of future negotiators. This has led
some more sensationalist interpreters to suggest that the agency will take the form of a “Latino
FBI.”79 As thrilling as the prospect of teams of Hombres G kicking down doors throughout the
region might sound, this is an overstatement of what is actually intended. Instead, the agency
appears to be more of a clearing house for intelligence, requests for mutual legal assistance, and
the enforcement of confiscation orders.
While such a body might not seem revolutionary (it is not unlike EUROPOL, for
example), it has great potential to strengthen the effectiveness of enforcement as a whole. By
centralizing the proliferation of requests for assistance/enforcement and removing them from the
more general Mutual Legal Assistance process, this could increase both the breadth and speed of
mutual assistance generally. This is particularly promising when considering the emphasis
COPLA puts on the confiscation of TOC assets for the purpose of dismantling and weakening
criminal organizations.80
The Regional Intelligence Agency, then, has the potential to allow a single state to issue a
request for confiscation analogous to those under article 13 of the UNTOC, or article 5 (4)(a) of
the Vienna Narcotics Convention which could be quickly and widely enforced, leaving no time
for targeted organizations to effectively protect their assets. Just as multinational businesses
follow the incentives of tax breaks and cheap labour, TOC organizations, facing hostile
conditions in one region, decamp for more hospitable climes. By facilitating quick and
coordinated action across the region, COPLA’s Regional Intelligence Agency may help in
ensuring that when a state strikes against a criminal organization it will not be able to gain a
foothold to re-establish elsewhere easily.
This being said, an increase in effectiveness of interstate enforceability of judgements
could have dangerous consequences in the context of a region where many countries suffer from
a deficit in the rule of law. The UNODC’s 2012 threat assessment of transnational organized
crime in Central America and the Caribbean notes that much of the recent increase in violence in
the northern triangle region of Central America can be traced to greater enforcement in Mexico
which forced TOC out of that country and further into states with weaker rule of law. There, the
incoming organizations clashed with local groups for control of territory leading to more
violence and greater destabilization within the state.81 If the efficiency of widespread cross
border investigation and asset seizure were to be increased without planning, a similar
phenomenon could occur. By increasing the ability for co-ordinated enforcement of seizures and
arrests, pressure will increase on TOC throughout the region. The only states which will remain
safe for TOC groups will be those unable to enforce these coordinated requests for aid. This has
the potential to further incentivize TOC groups to move into these states and exacerbate the
violence and confrontation there.
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COPLA’s proposal for cooperation run through a centralized body leaves the potential
not only for more efficient, but also more strategically effective cooperation. A centralized body
would potentially have the ability to monitor investigations across the regions and make
recommendations about how best to coordinate enforcement to emphasize restraint and burden
sharing, so that disparate enforcement does not lead to more violence in affected regions. Such a
project would require significant centralization of information, and compliance by States Parties
which is far beyond the scope of tentative proposal in article 37 of the current draft statute.

The Supranational Model
Despite the possible implications for interstate cooperation, the COPLA proposal is
undeniably a document focussed primarily on exploring the potential of a supranational approach
to the enforcement of TCL. The challenges for supranational approaches to transnational lawmaking are the perfect inverse of those which plague the cooperation model.
While the cooperation approach struggles to develop methods for ensuring that the
legitimately-made decisions of sovereign states are accepted and facilitated by their peers,82 the
supranational model circumvents this issue through top down decision making that effects the
legal obligations of a group of states. In Sieber’s view, however, what this model gains in
efficiency and unity of action, it gives up in effectiveness and legitimacy.83 Because
supranational institutions are a step removed from both the enforcement powers of their
constituent states and the governing institutions which legitimize the use of these powers, they
must work to ensure firstly, that their decisions will be enforceable and secondly, that their
decisions are sufficiently reflective of the will of these states to encourage them to continue to
comply with this enforcement regime.
To ensure enforcement, COPLA employs two distinctly effective methods which
correspond with those identified by Sieber, to approximate the coercive power of a state and to
ensure compliance. Firstly, it relies on the security and law enforcement bodies of the individual
states to enforce their decisions. COPLA proposes a particularly robust version of this approach
of enforcement, mandating in Article 37 the creation of divisions within the security forces of
each state to carry out orders of the court. From the text of Article 37, these enforcement
divisions would seem to remain under the direct control of the individual states, but would be
devoted primarily to the quick and effective execution of court decisions. It is easy to be
skeptical about the viability of this clause, in that it appears to envision a significant surrender of
state enforcement power directly to the Court, and because it envisions a court whose activities
are so numerous as to require the maintenance of its own security division on standby in each
state. Ultimately, though, it is an ambitious position from which to start the discussion around
meaningful enforcement and it demonstrates a concern for making the court an effective
supranational institution.
Second, in addition to any hard power it might exercise through the proxy of state law
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enforcement, the COPLA proposal would provide the Court’s institutions with a certain amount
of soft power. As described in Article 20 of the draft statute, the Prosecutor of the court would,
like the Prosecutor of the ICC, act independently to carry out investigations and bring charges
against individuals. This power to initiate investigations, which inevitably brings scrutiny on
states for their inaction or complicity, operates somewhat like the “naming and shaming”
procedures employed by certain supranational organizations.84 Depending on how the
Prosecutor’s powers take shape in future drafts, this power could allow the Prosecutor to quickly
and flexibly call states to task for their failure to enforce norms, without requiring the
engagement of a slow or involved decision-making process towards more formal binding legal
orders or conventional coercive power.
These combined measures would entrust the court with fairly significant normative
power. But in order to ensure continued cooperation of local enforcement agencies to carry out
these orders, and for these agencies to feel compelled to react to the soft power of the
prosecutor’s office, the court requires legitimacy.85 Sieber links legitimacy to two types of
institutional feature - democratic control and respect for state sovereignty.86 COPLA incorporates
elements of both of these approaches in its proposal at every decision making step.
Sieber gives, as an example of a high standard for legitimizing super national legal
decision making, the treaty of Lisbon, which sets out the constitutional structure of decision
making at the EU,87 and which requires several phases of parliamentary approval to legitimize
decision making. As a court, which, by its nature is not a legislative body and is independent
from parliamentary approval, COPLA has limited recourse to the parliamentary model of
legitimation. This being said, the COPLA proposal suggests employing a broad array of
procedures to ensure both democratic oversight and diverse geographic representation in
decision-making. The court would be overseen, for instance, by an assembly of representatives
from the each of the States Parties, who elect a board of 21 members (18 members at large, two
vice presidents and a president).88 The assembly would oversee the court, set the budget,
establish subsidiary bodies, determine the composition of the court, and would be ultimately
responsible for administration.
Judges would be elected by the assembly, with each state party nominating a candidate.
The Prosecutor would be elected by the assembly, though the prosecutor’s office would be
composed of representatives from each state. A secretary would also be chosen by the president
of the board based on the recommendation of the assembly. Unlike the ICC, the COPLA
proposal also mandates the creation of a Defense Branch, whose composition would be decided
by election.89 Moreover, COPLA supplements these governance mechanisms with principles
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drawn from principles on which most national courts base their legitimacy, such as the open
court (article 20(10)), and rights of appeal (article 15) inter alia.90
Where parliamentary decision-making is impossible, Sieber notes that a viable alternative
is to ensure that the supranational bodies’ decision making powers are as limited and un-invasive
as possible.91 COPLA achieves this goal through the strict requirement of complementarity, its
limited jurisdiction to make decisions, and its reliance on state aid to carry out its decisions.
These restrictions would allow COPLA to minimize criticism when it is forced to make decisions
which are not subject to direct democratic approval.

Using the Regional Model as a Catalyst for Ordered Pluralism
Beyond the question of whether COPLA builds an institution whose decisions can be
effectively enforced with a semblance of legitimacy lies the more fundamental consideration of
whose interests will be served by this institution. A persistent problem in the development of
TCL has been a democratic deficit which lies at the heart of the process by which suppression
treaties are created.92 While, on its face the, the process of treaty formation is seen as an
agreement between nominally equal states, reflecting the interests of all parties, in reality the
power and influence of individual states varies wildly. As a result, when treaties are negotiated, it
is often entirely on the initiative and terms of the most powerful states, who create treaties that
serve their interests at the expense of others.93
In some iterations the TCL treaty making process, rather than representing a good faith
democratic effort to combat the struggles of all affected states, is instead an exercise in
expanding the hegemony of powerful states. In the trafficking context, for instance, this
hegemonic influence has often manifested itself as a program which serves the interests of
enforcement in richer consumer state, with tragic consequences for poorer producer states.
Powerful states demand strict suppression on the supply side with little effective action in
moderating demand, forcing poorer, weaker states into violent confrontations with producers
inside within their borders, overburdening their enforcement powers and leading to situations
like that in Latin America today.94 The truly innovative feature of COPLA as an instrument of
TCL is how it disrupts the destructive status quo of the suppression treaties on which it is based,
by allowing states to more easily live up to their obligations under these treaties while
prioritizing the interests of States Parties, rather than those of a distant hegemon.
The French legal scholar Mireille Delmas-Marty suggests that, in order to correct the
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destructive tendencies of the current suppression treaty model, while ensuring the development
of law which addresses transnational criminal concerns, we must aim to create a system of
“ordered pluralism”95 which balances the inevitable influence of powerful states and
international obligation with “an authentic margin of national appreciation”.96 To achieve this,
she suggests that the norms underlying the suppression treaty process must be rewritten. Rather
than allowing powerful states to calque their law into transnational obligations, Delmas-Marty
suggest to undertake a Chomskian project to uncover a universal grammar of international
principles to govern suppression treaties.97
This new grammar would set broad obligations of enforcement and cooperation but allow
states to implement them on their own terms. Such an approach would need to be outcomes
based, and open to re-evaluating existing strategies. It would also need to be freed from the tacit
imposition of (mainly) common law principles of law and culpability, so as to be adaptable to
local regimes. The system should also provide for a more flexible system of interstate
cooperation, allowing for state adjustment and, finally, a stronger appreciation of human rights.98
As a body which is predicated entirely on pre-existing suppression treaties, COPLA is
evidently incapable of achieving all of these objectives. On the other hand, the project’s structure
and stated goals provide an example of how regional organizations might function as an
intermediary solution to gain a measure of national appreciation under treaties by which they are
already bound. Through political unity, and the creation of a bulwark against tools of compulsory
enforcement such as forced extradition, the COPLA proposal is able to add texture to the TOC
suppression regime, refocussing the effort on an outcomes-based approach, allowing for a reevaluation of previous approaches, nuancing the cooperation regime.
A notable feature of the COPLA campaign, in all of its preliminary statements, has been
the de-emphasizing of the importance of actually supressing the commission of Treaty Crimes.99
Instead, COPLA’s preparatory materials focus on achieving the goal of dismantling
organizations which, through the profits of transnational criminal activity, have become powerful
enough to threaten the rule of law. The UN General Assembly Resolution100 that adopted the
UNTOC makes no mention of the role of TOC in corroding rule of law and promoting violence.
While the Vienna Convention does mention the potential for trade in illicit substances to
“generat(e) large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to
penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and
financial business, and society”, this is clearly subordinate to the desire to suppress consumption
in consumer states on the grounds that these constitute a moral and health concern.101 As noted
above, simple enforcement against street level criminals has only resulted in increased conflict
and violence, which has forced groups to relocate but has done nothing to alleviate the problem.
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COPLA could provide for a re-evaluation of the existing model. In perfect contrast to the
suppression treaties it enforces, the project’s preparatory documents have little to say about the
motivations for criminalizing the trafficking and production of illicit goods; instead they speak at
length about the need to respond to the violent and destabilizing effects of the groups who
engage in them.102 Rather than valorizing street level confrontations, which do little to weaken
the drug trade, they outline a new strategy for enforcement which focuses on a top down
deconstruction of criminal organizations. This strategy aims to deprive TOC groups of the
organizational structures and resources which allow them to function.103 This philosophy is
instantiated in the draft statute, which gives jurisdiction only over those who organize or incite
the trade for their profit, thus removing street level producers and traffickers from the ambit of
the court.104 Though the statute does nothing to relieve states of their duties to enforce
under the old treaty, it challenges the status quo of enforcement against low level criminals,
instead significantly increasing capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute perpetrators
from higher echelons of TOC groups, facilitating changes of strategy at the national level as
well.
By taking these steps, COPLA has effectively jury-rigged a method for allowing states to
re-evaluate their approach to treaty crime enforcement to better serve regional needs. In this way,
COPLA injects a measure of regional, if not national, appreciation into the existing system and
moves the regime somewhat closer to the ideal of ordered pluralism. In particular, the project
makes inroads toward the goals of ordered pluralism in the domain of enforcement. While the
draft statute does not entirely abandon the model of coordination and cooperation as a primary
method of enforcement, as I have noted above the proposed Regional Intelligence Agency
presents a potential forum to formulate ongoing recommendations for how to meet these
obligations and at the same time providing leeway for a bespoke approach to implementation.
Finally, it is worth noting that any fulsome notion of ordered pluralism should include
within its ambit protection of the human rights of the accused person. The TCL regime, focused
as it is on prosecution and enforcement, contains significant gaps in terms of the application and
implementation of human rights protection within the cooperation process, in particular.105 There
are many cracks for people being investigated and prosecuted to fall through. The Rome Statute
contains substantial human rights protections for accused persons, though mostly at the trial
level. There is significant potential for COPLA to plug some of the gaps and provide an ordered
model of transnational criminal process that upholds human rights protections and thus
strengthens, however indirectly, the legitimacy of the TCL system. In our view, this possibility is
worth exploring as the drafting moves forward.

Conclusion
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As noted at the outset, the objective of this article was to introduce and evaluate the
proposal for the creation of COPLA at a primarily conceptual level. Given the preliminary nature
of the current draft we are still, as the saying goes, taking a view from 30,000 feet. There is little
doubt that as currently envisioned, COPLA would play a unique role within the overall system of
suppression of transnational crime, and in particular that like the Malabo Protocol it might
introduce institutional and normative support for this mission on a geographic basis. As political
momentum appears to be gathering, this development is worth watching.
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APPENDIX A: Draft Statute of the Criminal Court for Latin America and the Caribbean
against transnational organized crime

December 2017

*Possible member countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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PART I. ESTABLISHING THE COURT

Article 1 – Principles, Definitions and Purposes
1. This international treaty establishes the Criminal Court for Latin America and the Caribbean
against transnational organized crime, hereinafter “the Court.”
2. The Court shall be a permanent institution, complementary to the national systems of criminal
justice. Its purpose shall be to investigate and prosecute the leaders and heads of criminal
organizations responsible for committing the crimes indicated herein and in the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and their attached protocols (Palermo
Convention, 2000), in accordance with the mechanisms established herein.
For these purposes, the Court will be authorized to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
acts that constitute a transnational crime committed by organized criminal groups in cases that
the national systems of justice are unwilling or unable to try.

Article 2 – Independence of the Court and Relationship with Other International and
Regional Organizations
1. The Court will be independent of any pre-existing international or regional organization and
of any that may be created in the future. It may cooperate with them through an agreement that
must be approved by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) using the mechanisms established
herein.
2. Nothing herein shall be interpreted in a way that in any manner limits or diminishes existing
or developing standards of international law for purposes other than this Statute.

Article 3 - Seat of the Court
1. The Court will sit in the territory of one of the States Parties, the location to be determined
during the first session of the Assembly of States Parties.
2. The Court will conclude with the host State an agreement regarding both the establishment and
proper functioning of the headquarters, as well as diplomatic immunities indicated herein. The
host State will be responsible for ensuring the security of the members, officials and others
involved in the cases under the Court's jurisdiction, as well as the security of the diplomatic
seat of the Court, as established in this statute.
3. The Court may sit elsewhere if it sees fit, in accordance with the terms hereof.
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Article 4 – Legal Status and Powers of the Court
1. The Court will have international legal status and the necessary legal capacity for the fulfilment
of its purposes and the performance of its duties.
2. The Court may exercise its duties and powers in accordance with the terms hereof in the
territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, in the territory of any other State that so
requests.
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PART II. COMPETENCE, ADMISSIBILITY AND APPLICABLE LAW

Article 5 - Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
1. The Court will be competent to judge those who direct, administer, organize or promote a
transnational organized criminal group intended to commit any of the following crimes:
a) Illicit trafficking of narcotics or psychotropic substances
b) Manufacture and/or illicit trafficking of firearms, their components, parts and ammunition
c) Trafficking of persons
d) Smuggling of migrants
e) Trafficking of cultural property
f) Money laundering
g) Transnational bribery
2. The Assembly of States Parties, by a majority of two thirds of its members, may extend the
jurisdiction of the Court to additional crimes, and must consider any further crime added to the
Palermo Convention at the first session of the ASP following the adoption of said new crime.
3. For the crimes included in paragraph 1 of this article, the Court may impose a penalty of 4 to 30
years of imprisonment, plus the accessory penalties stipulated herein.

Article 6 – Definitions
1. “Organized criminal group” means a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a
period of time, and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more crimes specified
herein, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

2. The crime will be considered transnational if:
a) It is committed in more than one State;
b) It is committed within one State but a substantial part of its execution, direction or control
is carried out in another State or States;
c) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State or States, or the
proceeds of the crime are used in another State or States.
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3. a) “Trafficking of narcotics” means the production, manufacture, extraction, preparation,
supply, distribution, sale, delivery in any condition, brokerage, shipment, shipment in transit,
transport, importation, exportation or financing of operations concerning any of the above for
any narcotic or psychotropic substance, contrary to current international law.
b) “Firearm” means any weapon covered in the Protocol against the illicit manufacture and
trafficking of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, as a supplement to the
United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime.
c) “Trafficking of persons” means the capture, transport, transfer, taking or receiving of
persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deceit, abuse of power or of a situation of vulnerability, the granting or receiving of payments
or benefits to obtain the consent of a person who has authority over another for the purposes
of exploitation, or the financing of operations concerning the above. It will at least include the
exploitation of the prostitution of others and any other form of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery and similar practices, servitude and the extraction of organs, under the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish the Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime.
d) “Smuggling of migrants” means facilitating the illegal entry of a person to a State Party of
which he or she is not a national or resident, for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly,
a financial or other material benefit, as established in the Protocol against the Illicit Trafficking
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, which is a supplement to the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime.
e) “Illicit trafficking of cultural property” means the importation, exportation or transfer of
ownership of cultural property, in violation of the provisions adopted by the States Parties
under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, the UNIDROIT Convention for Stolen or Illicitly Exported
Cultural Objects, and the Convention on Measures to Prohibit and Impede the Illicit
Importation, Exportation and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
f) ‘Money laundering’ means the process by which the assets of illicit origin from any of the
crimes specified herein or in the legislation of the States Parties, understood as the previous
crime, enter the legal economic system as having been obtained lawfully, whether by
converting, transferring, administering, selling, taxing, simulating or in any other way putting
the goods on the market, provided that they are worth more than ten million U.S. dollars
(US$10,000,000) or the equivalent, whether in a single or successive acts.
If the above-mentioned crime is subject to a final sentence in one of the States Parties, it will
be considered to have been committed in both States when the one in which the money
laundering operation as defined in the United Nations Convention against Corruption took
place is a State other than the one in which the crime was first committed.
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Article 7- Temporal Jurisdiction
1. The Court will only have jurisdiction over crimes committed after the entry into force of this
Statute.
2. For States that join subsequently, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction only for crimes
committed after this Statute comes into force for that State.

Article 8 - Personal Jurisdiction
The Court will have jurisdiction only over persons who were at least eighteen (18) years old at the
time of the alleged commission of a crime.

Article 9 – Prerequisites for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
1. The States Parties hereto accept the jurisdiction of the Court for the crimes specified herein.
2. States that are not parties hereto and request the Court to intervene must deposit their request
with the Secretary of the Court, and consent to having the Court exercise its jurisdiction for
the crime in question. The accepting State will cooperate with the Court without delay or
exception, as provided herein.
Article 10 - Questions of Admissibility
1. Keeping in mind article 1, the Court will determine the admissibility of a case on the basis of
the following:

a.

The case has not been investigated or tried by a State that has jurisdiction over it, because
it was unwilling or unable to do so.

b.

The accused was subject to an international arrest order and at least six months passed
without the execution of his arrest.

c.

The State party with jurisdiction over the case issued a final acquittal that is interpreted
by the Court as an invalid res judicata.

d.

The case has not previously been nor is currently subject to an investigation or trial by an
international or regional tribunal.

2. In the cases mentioned above, in order to determine the inability or failure to decide to
investigate or try a particular case, the Court will consider whether the State in question, owing
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to a total or substantial collapse of its national judicial system or to a lack thereof, is unable or
unwilling to try the accused, but has the necessary evidence and testimony and/or to conduct
the trial for any other reason of fact or law.

Article 11 – Statutory Limitations
1. The States Parties commit to amend their national constitutions so that the crimes under the
jurisdiction of the Court are not subject to any statute of limitations.
2. Once all the States Parties have made these amendments, the crimes under the jurisdiction of
the Court will not be subject to any statute of limitations.

Article 12 – Intent
1. Unless provided otherwise, a person will be criminally responsible and may be punished for a
crime in the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements of the crime were committed
intentionally and with knowledge of the material elements of the crime.

2. For the purposes of this article, an act is deemed intentional if:
a.

The person in question meant to do it;

b.

The consequence was intended, or the person in question was aware of what would
happen in the normal course of events.

3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness of a particular circumstance or
that a consequence would occur in the normal course of events. The terms “knowingly” and
“with knowledge” have the same meaning.

Article 13 - Circumstances Exempting Persons from Criminal Liability
1. Without prejudice to the other exculpatory circumstances established herein, no person will be
criminally responsible who, at the time of the action in question:

a.

Had a mental illness or deficiency that made him or her unable to appreciate the illegality
or nature of his or her conduct, or limited his or her ability to control his or her conduct
so as not to break the law;
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b.

Was in a state of intoxication that deprived him of the ability to appreciate the illegality
or nature of his conduct, or limited his ability to control his conduct so as not to break the
law, unless he was intoxicated voluntarily, knowing that, as a result of being intoxicated,
he would probably engage in conduct deemed to be a crime in the jurisdiction of the
Court, or overlook the risk of that occurring;

c.

Was acting reasonably in his own or another person’s defence or to protect property that
was essential for his own or another person’s survival from the imminent use of illicit
force, such actions being in proportion to the degree of danger for him, the other person
or the property being protected. Using force in an act of defence is not sufficient to exempt
an individual from criminal liability under this paragraph;

d.

Engaged in conduct that would presumably be a crime under the jurisdiction of the Court
as a consequence of coercion arising from a threat of imminent death or continued or
imminent serious bodily harm for him or another person, and was compelled to act in a
necessary and reasonable way to avoid that threat, provided that he did not intend to cause
greater harm than the harm he was trying to avoid. That threat may:

d.i.

Have been made by other persons, or

d.ii.

Have arisen from circumstances beyond his control.

2. The Court will determine if the exculpatory circumstances admitted hereunder apply in the
particular case.

Article 14 - Error in Fact or Error in Law
1. Errors of fact are exculpatory only if they remove the intent required for the crime.
2. Errors of law concerning whether a particular type of conduct constitutes a crime in the
jurisdiction of the Court are not considered exculpatory. However, an error of law may be
considered exculpatory if it was inevitable.
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PART III. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURT

Article 15 - Organs of the Court
The Court will consist of the following organs: the Presidency; an Appeals Division, a Trial
Division, and a Pre- Trial Division;; the Prosecution; the Defence; the Secretariat. Equitable
representation of both genders will apply for all positions not subject to election by the States
Parties.

Article 16 - Performance of the Duties of Magistrates
1. The magistrates on the Court will be chosen to work exclusively in this position and will be
available to perform their duties as soon as their term begins.
2. The magistrates who constitute the Presidency will perform their duties exclusively as soon as
they are elected.
3. Depending on the volume of work of the Court, and in consultation with its members, the
Presidency may decide how much time will be necessary for the other magistrates and officials
to perform their duties exclusively.

Article 17 - Selection of Magistrates
1. Each State Party must nominate a judge as a member of the Court. In appointing judges, it must
follow the procedure provided for appointing members of its supreme court.

2. The judge proposed will join the Court upon approval by a simple majority of the Assembly of
States Parties.

3. Judges will hold their position for seven years, and may not be re-elected.

Article 18 - Independence of Magistrates
1. Magistrates will be independent in performing their duties.

2. Magistrates will not carry on any activity that may be incompatible with the exercise of their
judicial duties or undermine confidence in their independence.
30

3. Magistrates who are required to perform their duties exclusively at the Court cannot hold any
other professional position except teaching and research, provided that the volume or nature
thereof does not interfere with the performance of their duties as magistrates of the Court.

4. Questions concerning the application of paragraphs 2 and 3 will be resolved by an absolute
majority of the magistrates. The magistrate in question will not participate in the decision.
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PART IV. VICTIMS AND THEIR RIGHTS

Article 19 - Complainants

1. The Court may admit as complainants the victims of the acts specified herein.

2. The Court may admit as complainants civil society organizations whose purpose is related to
fighting organized crime.

3. The Court may admit as amicus curiae civil society organizations that, while not acting as
witnesses, may provide information on the modus operandi of the persons and organizations under
investigation, or any other information deemed relevant.
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PART V. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROSECUTION

Article 20 - The Prosecution
1. The Prosecution will act independently as a separate organ of the Court. It will be tasked with
receiving referrals and corroborated information on crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court,
in order to proceed with an analysis and, if applicable, move forward with an investigation
and prosecution before the Court. The members of the Prosecution will neither request nor
comply with instructions from outside the Court.

2. The Prosecution will consist of a representative of each State Party hereto.

3. The Prosecution will be headed by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor will have full authority to
direct and administer the Prosecution, including the staff, facilities and other resources. The
Prosecutor may be assisted by one or more deputy prosecutors, specially appointed for
particular cases that so require, who may perform any of the appropriate duties hereunder. The
prosecutors must be of different nationalities, and will perform their duties exclusively; they
may have no other professional or commercial occupation, except for academia.

4. The Prosecutors will be of high moral character, with a high level of competence and extensive
practical experience in prosecuting or substantiating criminal cases. They must have an
excellent knowledge and mastery of at least one of the working languages of the Court.

5. The Prosecutor will be elected in a secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the
Assembly of States Parties. He will hold his position for nine years and cannot be re-elected.

6. The Prosecutor will not carry on any activity that may interfere with the performance of his
duties or reduce confidence in his independence.

7. The Presidency may, at the request of the Prosecutor, relieve him or her of acting in a particular
case.
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8. The Prosecutor will not participate in any case that, on any ground, may reasonably cast doubt
on his or her impartiality.

9. The Prosecutor will name expert legal advisers on specific issues, such as sexual violence,
gender-based violence and violence against children, drug trafficking, money laundering or
any other subject that may require specialized knowledge or expertise.

10. As an exception to the principle of the public nature of hearings, the chambers of the Court
may, in order to protect victims and witnesses, or an accused, order part of a trial to be held in
camera or authorize the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In
particular, these measures will apply in the case of victims of sexual violence or minors who
are victims or witnesses, unless otherwise decided by the Court considering all the
circumstances, especially the opinion of the victim or witness concerned.

11. Throughout any phase of the trial, as deemed appropriated by the Court, the Court will allow
for victims to bring forward opinions and observations if their personal interests are affected,
but must do so in a manner that is not detrimental to the rights of the accused, or to a fair and
impartial trial, or incompatible therewith. The legal representatives of the victims may present
these opinions and observations when the Court sees fit, in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.

12. When the disclosure of evidence or information hereunder would seriously endanger the
security of a witness or his family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceeding
prior to the trial, not present this evidence or information, and instead present a summary
thereof. Such measures cannot prejudice the rights of the accused, or the right to a fair and
impartial trial, or be incompatible therewith.

13. Any State may request any measures as may be necessary to protect its officials or agents, as
well as the confidentiality or secrecy of information.
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PART VI. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE

Article 21 - The Defence
1. The Defence is an organ that ensures access to justice and comprehensive legal assistance, in
individual and collective cases, in accordance with the principles, duties and provisions
established herein. It takes any action to protect and defend the fundamental rights of
individuals, especially those who are vulnerable and do not have their own legal defence.

2. The Defence will consist of 10 defence attorneys, eligible for the case of an accused who does
not have his own defence attorney. The said defence attorney will not act permanently, but
only when called upon.

3. The Defence will consist of persons of high moral character, with a high level of competence
and extensive practical experience in criminal trials or the substantiation of criminal cases.
They must have an excellent knowledge and mastery of at least one of the working languages
of the Court.

4. The Defence Attorney will be elected in a secret ballot by an absolute majority of members of
the Assembly of States Parties. He will hold his position for nine years and cannot be reelected.

5. The Defence will have access to expert legal advisers appointed by the prosecution as specified
herein.
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PART VII. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECRETARIAT

Article 22 - The Secretariat
1. The Secretariat will be responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration of the
Court and for providing it with services.

2. The Secretariat will be directed by the Secretary, who will be the chief administrative officer
of the Court. The Secretary will exercise his duties under the authority of the President of the
Court.

3. The Secretary must be a person of good moral character, highly competent and have an
excellent knowledge and mastery of at least one of the working languages of the Court.

4. The Assembly of States Parties will recommend candidates for the position of secretary, who
will be selected by the President.

5. The Secretary will serve for four years; he will hold this position exclusively and his term is
renewable once.
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PART VIII. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE STAFF

Article 23 - The Staff
1. The Prosecutor and the Defence Attorneys will appoint the qualified officials needed in their
respective offices. In the case of the Prosecutor, this will include the appointment of
investigators.

2. In appointing the officials, the Prosecutor and the Defence Attorneys will ensure the highest
level of efficiency, competence and integrity.

3. The Secretary, with the consent of the Presidency, will propose regulations for staff, setting
forth the conditions for appointing, compensating and dismissing the staff of the Court. The
Staff Regulations will be subject to approval by the Assembly of States Parties.

4. The Court may, in exceptional circumstances, call on the expertise of staff provided free of
charge by States Parties or intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations to
collaborate in the work of any organ of the Court. The Prosecutor and the Defence may accept
such offers in their respective fields. The staff provided free of charge will be employed in
accordance with rules established by the Assembly of States Parties.
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PART IX. THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES

Article 24 - Assembly of States Parties
1. An Assembly of the States Parties hereto is established. Each State Party will have a
representative in the Assembly, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. Other States
signatories of this Statute or of the Final Act may participate in the Assembly as observers.

2. The Assembly will:

a.

Consider and approve, as appropriate, the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee;

b.

Supervise the Presidency, the Prosecutor and the Secretariat on matters related to the
administration of the Court;

c.

Consider the reports and activities of the Board pursuant to paragraph 3 and take the
appropriate action with respect thereto;

d.

Consider and decide on the budget of the Court;

e.

If appropriate, in accordance with article 36, change the number of magistrates;

f.

Perform the other duties under this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

3. The Assembly will have a Board, consisting of a President, two Vice Presidents and 18
members elected by the Assembly for a period of three years;

a.

The Board will be representative, taking into account, in particular, the principle of
equitable geographic distribution and proper representation of the principal legal systems
of the world;

b.

The Board will meet as often as necessary, but at least once a year, and will assist the
Assembly in the performance of its duties.

4. The Assembly may establish the subsidiary organs that it deems necessary, including an
independent supervision mechanism responsible for inspecting, evaluating and investigating
the Court in order to make it more effective and efficient.
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5. The President of the Court, the Prosecutor and the Secretary or their representatives may, as
appropriate, participate in sessions of the Assembly and of the Board.

6. The Assembly will meet at the seat of the Court or at United Nations Headquarters once a year
and, when required, hold extraordinary sessions. Unless indicated otherwise herein, the
extraordinary sessions will be convened by the Board on its own initiative or on request by a
third of the States Parties.

7. Each State Party will have one vote. The Assembly and the Board will do everything possible
to reach decisions by consensus. If they cannot reach consensus, and unless this Statute
provides otherwise:

a.

Decisions on fundamental questions will be by a two-thirds majority of those present and
voting, and an absolute majority of the States Parties will constitute a quorum for voting;

b.

Decisions on questions of procedure will be made by a simple majority of the States
Parties present and voting.

8. States Parties that are in arrears in paying their financial contributions to the expenses of the
Court will not have a vote in the Assembly and on the Board, if the amount owed is equal to
or greater than the total of the contributions owed for the previous two full years. Nevertheless,
the Assembly may permit such States to vote in the Assembly and on the Board if the Assembly
concludes that the delay is due to circumstances beyond the control of the State Party
concerned.

9. The Assembly will approve its own standing orders.

10. The official and working languages of the Assembly will be Spanish, Portuguese and English.
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PART X. COMMON PROVISIONS FOR ALL THE ORGANS, PARTIES, WITNESSES,
VICTIMS AND COMPLAINANT ORGANIZATIONS

Article 25 - Privileges and Immunities
1. The Court shall enjoy, in the territory of each State Party, such privileges and immunities asare
necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. The magistrates, the prosecutor and deputy prosecutors, the defence attorney, the complainants
and the Secretary, when performing their duties or in relation thereto, will have the same
privileges and immunities granted to the heads of diplomatic missions. Once their term of
office has ended, they will continue to be accorded immunity from legal process of every kind
in respect of words which had been spoken or written and acts which had been performed by
them in their official capacity.

3. The private defence attorneys, experts, witnesses or other persons whose presence is required
in the Court will be treated as required for the proper operation of the Court, in accordance
with the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court.

Article 26 – Protection of Witnesses, Victims, Experts and Complainants

1. Using the security forces placed at its disposal by the States Parties, the Court will provide the
protection that it considers necessary for all the witnesses, victims, experts, complainants,
members of organizations presenting amicus curiae briefs and officials of all organs of the Court.

2. The Court will create a system to protect witnesses, victims, experts and complainants and
make it available to all who request it, in cases where their physical safety is in danger.

3. The Court may also offer this protection to witnesses, victims, experts and complainants
participating in proceedings related to organized crime, if the judges of the State concerned so
request.
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4. The system mentioned above will be the one already offered by the States Parties in their
domestic legislation. This protection will be in effect from the start of the trial until 10 years after
the sentence.

Article 27 - Salaries, Stipends and Living Allowances
The Magistrates, the Prosecutor, the Defence Attorney and the Secretary will receive the salaries,
stipends and living allowances decided by the Assembly of States Parties. These salaries and
stipends will not be reduced during their term of office.

Article 28 - Official and Working Languages
1. The official languages of the Court will be Spanish, Portuguese and English. The sentences of
the Court, as well as other decisions on fundamental questions before the Court, will be
published in the official languages. The Presidency, in accordance with the criteria established
in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, will determine what decisions concern fundamental
questions for the purposes of this paragraph.

2. The working languages of the Court will be Spanish, Portuguese and English. The Rules of
Procedure and Evidence will determine in what cases other official languages may be used as
a working language.

3. The Court will authorize any of the parties or any of the States that are permitted to intervene
in a proceeding, at their request, to use a language other than Spanish, Portuguese and English,
when it sees fit to do so.
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PART XI. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Article 29 - Rights of the Accused
1. Presumption of innocence:

a. Everyone will be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the Court in accordance
with applicable law.
b. It will fall to the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused.
c. In issuing a guilty verdict, the Court must be convinced that the accused is guilty
beyond any reasonable doubt.

2. In responding to any charge, the accused will have a right to be heard publicly, taking into
account the provisions of this Statute, and to a fair and impartial trial, as well as the following
minimum guarantees:

a. To be informed without delay and in detail, in a language that he understands and
speaks perfectly, of the nature, the cause and the content of the charges against him;
b. To have sufficient time and resources to prepare his defence and to communicate freely
and confidentially with a defence attorney of his choice;
c. To be judged without undue delay;

3. The accused will have a right to be present during the trial and to defend himself personally or
be assisted by a defence attorney of his choice; to be informed, if he does not have a defence
attorney, of his right to one and, if it is in the interest of justice, a defence attorney will be
appointed for him, at no cost to him if he cannot pay;

a. To question witnesses for the prosecution or have them questioned and to have
witnesses for the defence appear and be questioned under the same conditions as
witnesses for the prosecution. The accused will also have a right to object and to present
any other admissible evidence in accordance herewith;
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b. To be assisted free of charge by a competent interpreter and to obtain the translations
required for the sake of equity, if the proceedings in Court or the documents presented
to the Court are in a language that he neither understands nor speaks;
c. To not be obliged to testify against himself or to admit guilt and to remain silent,
without this being held against him in determining his guilt or innocence;
d. To testify orally or in writing in his defence without swearing an oath; and
e. To not bear the burden of proof or be required to present evidence in reply.

4. In addition to any other disclosure of information stipulated herein, the Prosecutor will disclose
to the defence, as soon as possible, the evidence in his possession or under his control and that,
at trial, would indicate or tend to indicate the innocence of the accused or to reduce his guilt or
that may affect the credibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
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PART XII. PENALTIES

Article 30 - Applicable Penalties
1.

The Court will apply the penalties provided herein, taking into account the aggravating and
extenuating factors of the particular case, and considering as aggravating the hierarchical
position of the accused within the structure of the criminal organization, whether he was a
public official under the domestic law of the States Parties, and also the number of States
in which the crime was committed. The Court will also consider as an aggravating factor
the use of protected legal goods, whether for transnational organized crimes or for related
offences specified by the States Parties, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and their additional protocols.

2. The Judge may reduce the penalty if the accused:

a) Reveals the identity of accomplices, participants or accessories after the fact of the acts
under investigation or of related acts, providing sufficient information to bring them to trial
or to significantly advance the investigation.
b) Provides information for seizing instruments, objects or effects related to the crimes
described here as well as valuables, goods, money or any other important asset used in
committing the crime.
c) Provides information that will lead to the dismantling of organizations intending to
commit the crimes described here.

3. Furthermore, the Court may:

a. Impose a fine under the terms of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
b. Order seizure of the proceeds, goods and assets arising directly or indirectly from this
crime, without prejudice to the rights of third parties in good faith.
c. Submit to the pertinent judicial bodies of the States Parties a request for confiscation
to be considered and applied for the above purposes under current national law.
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Article 31 – Precautionary Measures

1. The Court may embargo and seize goods and apply any type of precautionary measure for the
persons and objects involved in the trial.

Article 32 - Imposition of the Penalty
1. The Court, in imposing a prison sentence, will consider the time already served in detention.

2. When a person is found guilty of more than one crime, the Court will impose a penalty for
each one of them, and a common penalty specifying the total length of the prison sentence.

Article 33 - Trust Fund
1. The Assembly of States Parties will establish a trust fund to benefit victims of crimes, and their
families, in the jurisdiction of the Court.

2. The Court may order that money and goods received as fines or seized be transferred to the
Trust Fund.

3. The Trust Fund will be administered according to criteria set by the Assembly of States Parties.

Article 34- Application of Penalties by Countries and National Legislation
1. Nothing in this paragraph will interfere with the enforcement of pre-existing penalties at the
national level. The penalties established by this Court will not be combined with them but will
be enforced after.
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PART XIII. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE
SECURITY FORCES

Article 35 - General Obligation to Cooperate
The States Parties, in accordance with the terms hereof, will cooperate fully with the Court in
relation to the investigation and prosecution of crimes in the jurisdiction of the Court, in
accordance with the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
Article 36 - Terms Used
For the purposes hereof:
1. “Surrender” means the surrender of a person by a State to the Court in accordance with the
terms hereof;
2. “Extradition” means the delivery of a person by a State to another State in accordance with
the terms of a treaty or convention, or its domestic law.
Article 37 –Security Forces
Each State will appoint a special group within its established security forces to enforce the
decisions and orders of the Court, and will report on them to the State to which said forces will
subsequently belong.
Article 37 bis – Regional Intelligence Agency
The States Parties will share information and intelligence, and cooperate in the investigation of
crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. The means for creating the Regional Intelligence
Agency will be covered in the Additional Protocol.
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PART XIV. EXECUTION OF THE PENALTY

Article 38 – Duty of States in Executing Prison Sentences
1. A prison sentence will be executed in a State designated by the Court, other than the State of
which the accused is a citizen and the States in which he was convicted of the crime. The State
in which the sentence will be served will be chosen from a list of States that have indicated
their willingness to receive such convicts.

2. Each State will designate a maximum security penitentiary for the purposes of housing the
detainees and convicts for the crimes within the jurisdiction of this Court.

3. In stating its willingness to receive a convict, the State may set conditions, subject to
acceptance by the Court and conformity with this Part.

4. The State designated in a particular case will indicate to the Court without delay if it accepts
the designation.

a. The State executing the penalty will notify the Court of any circumstances, including
the conditions under paragraph 1, that could materially affect the conditions or duration
of the prison sentence. The Court must be informed of known or foreseeable
circumstances at least 45 days in advance.

5. The Court, on exercising its discretional authority to designate a State under paragraph 1, will
take into account:

a. The principle that the States Parties must share the responsibility for executing prison
sentences in accordance with the principles of equitable distribution stated in the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence;
b. The application of standards concerning the treatment of prisoners set forth in generally
accepted international treaties;
c. The nationality of the convict and the States in which the crime was committed;
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d. Other factors relating to the circumstances of the crime or the convict, or the effective
execution of the penalty, as may be appropriate in the designating of the executing
State.

Article 39 - Limitations on Trial or Punishment for Other Crimes
1. Convicts who are in the custody of the executing State will not be tried or punished or
extradited to another State for conduct that preceded their transfer to the executing State, unless
at the request of said State, the Court has approved such trial, punishment or extradition.
2. The Court will resolve the question after hearing the convict.
3. Paragraph 1 of this article will not apply if the convict remains voluntarily for more than 30
days in the territory of the executing State after completing the full sentence imposed by the
Court or if he returns to the territory of that State after leaving it.

Article 40 - Execution of Fines and Seizure Orders
1. The States Parties will enforce the fines or seizure orders imposed by the Court under Part VII,
without prejudice to the rights of third parties and in accordance with the procedure established
in their domestic law.
2. A State Party that cannot enforce the seizure order will take measures to collect the value of
the proceeds, the goods or the assets that the Court ordered seized, without prejudice to the
rights of third parties.
3. The goods, or the proceeds of the sale of immovable property or, if applicable, the sale of other
goods that the State Party may obtain in executing a decision of the Court shall be transferred
to the Court.

48

Part XV. AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 41 - Amendments
1. Seven years after the coming into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose
amendments to it by informing the Secretariat.

2. Three months after the date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties will decide, by
simple majority, whether to consider the proposal, which must be done as part of a Review
Conference.

3. The approval of any amendment will require a special majority of two thirds of the States
Parties, except in the case of limitation of the jurisdiction or powers of the Court and/or crimes
that it is competent to judge, in which case a special majority of three quarters of the States
Parties will be required.

4. Any amendment will come into force for the States Parties 12 months after the same proportion
of States has given the Secretary their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. If an amendment was accepted by three quarters of the States Parties under paragraph 4, State
Parties that do not accept it may withdraw from this Statute immediately, by giving notice no
later than one year after the amendment took effect.

6. The Secretary will distribute to the States Parties the amendments approved at a meeting of the
Assembly of States Parties or a Review Conference.

Article 42 - Amendments to Institutional Provisions
1. Notwithstanding article 41(1), any State Party may at any time propose exclusively
institutional amendments to the provisions of this Statute, that is, amendments concerning the
organization of the Court and its organs and related administrative questions. The text of the
proposed amendment will be presented to the Secretary or to the person designated by the
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Assembly of States Parties, who will distribute it without delay to the States Parties and the
other participants in the Assembly.

2. The amendments presented under this article on which it is not possible to reach consensus
will be approved by the Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference with a majority
of two thirds of the States Parties. These amendments will take effect for the States Parties six
months after their approval by the Assembly or the Conference, as the case may be.
Article 43 - Revision of the Statute
1. Seven years after this Statute comes into force, the Secretary will convene a Review
Conference of the States Parties to consider amendments to the Statute. The review may
include the list of crimes indicated in article 5 but will not be limited to them. The Conference
will be open to participants in the Assembly of States Parties and under the same conditions as
apply there.

2. Subsequently, at any time, at the request of a State Party and for the purposes of paragraph 1,
the Secretary General, with the approval of a majority of the States Parties, will convene a
Review Conference of the States Parties.

3. The provisions of paragraphs 3 to 6 of article 41 will apply to the approval and entry into force
of any amendment of the Statute considered at a Review Conference.

Article 44 – Transitional Provision
1. Notwithstanding the terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 11, a State, on becoming a party
hereto, may declare that, for a period of seven years from the date on which the Statute
came into force for it, it will not accept the jurisdiction of the Court for the category of
crimes in article 8 when the commission of one of these crimes by its national or in its
territory has been reported. The declaration under this article may be withdrawn at any
time. The terms of this article will be reconsidered at the Review Conference convened
under article 43(1).
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PART XVI. FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 45 - Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession
1. This Statute will be open to the signature of all States in Latin America and the Caribbean.

2. This Statute will be subject to the ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory States.
The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval will be deposited with the Secretary.

3. This Statute will be open to subsequent accession be any State in Latin America or the
Caribbean. The instruments of accession will be deposited with the Secretary General.

Article 46 - Entry into Force
1. This Statute will enter into force on the first day of the month following the date on which the
tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession was deposited with the
Secretary.

2. For every State that ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to the current Statute, it will come
into force on the first day of the month following the date on which it deposited its instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 47 – Withdrawal
1. Any State Party may withdraw from this Statute by giving the Secretary General written notice.
The withdrawal will take effect one year after the date on which notification was received,
unless a later date is indicated in the notice.

2. Withdrawal will not exempt the State from its obligations under this Statute while it is a party
to it, in particular the financial obligations that it has contracted, as well as the obligation not
to frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty with respect to fighting organized crime.
Withdrawal will not prevent cooperation with the Court on criminal investigations and trials,
with which the withdrawing State is obliged to cooperate and that began before the effective
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date of withdrawal; neither will the withdrawal in any way prevent continued consideration of
questions before the Court before the date on which the withdrawal takes effect.
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PART XVII. AUTHENTIC TEXTS

Article 48 - Authentic Texts
1. The original of this Statute is equally authentic in Spanish, Portuguese and English and will be
deposited with the Secretary General, who will send a certified copy to all States Parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments,
have signed this Statute.
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